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Urban structures and frameworks
Christian Vandermotten
1 Faced with the sheer diversity of the articles in this issue of Echogéo dedicated to urban
structures and frameworks, ranging from the micro to the macro, we had to place the
questions they address within a historical perspective, looking at the last half-century.
The issues below are connected to the topics addressed in the papers, as well as outlining
ideas that appear implicitly in the papers. 
2 What are likely to have been the main themes addressed in this issue forty or fifty years
ago, during the Fordist period of fast industrial-based growth in the European economy? 
3 Fist of all, the issue of “balancing metropolises” (“métropoles d’équilibre”) and urban networks.
According to this normative vision, territories were structured by the consolidation of
large regional cities and by the hierarchical, pyramidal dispatch of services along the
different levels of the urban network. The objectives were both to achieve the industrial
decentralization of the Paris region (Île-de-France), and to revitalize/industrialize small
towns in order to alleviate the negative effects of rural exodus and the extinction of
agriculture  where  a  large  workforce  was  formerly  employed.  In  periods  of  full
employment, rural areas were required to serve the needs of a Taylorized industry in
search of a labor pool. 
4 Secondly,  the  analysis  of  peri-urbanization in  terms of  rapid  population growth,  which
proceeded by contiguity  and successive circles,  outward from the edges  of  the main
morphological conglomerations. Suburbanization was chosen in the case of the upper and
intermediary social classes, while this choice was more imposed in the lower classes -
although this move was then positively valued in the latter group too, even when people
were  moving  to  council  estates.  These  properties  were  not  at  the  time  socially
stigmatized as they are now, and were seen as an unquestionable improvement upon the
living conditions of the past. 
5 Finally, the question of transport infrastructure including routes and in some cases impacts.
An analysis would have looked at three different scales: the main structuring motorways
(and later on the railway routes) between Paris and the “balancing metropolises”; the
transport  infrastructures  that  created  a  polarized  interconnection  of  territories;  and
intra-urban  networks,  in  particular  in  terms  of  road  building  schemes.  These
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infrastructures, which necessitated large investments, were the result of an impetus and
planning processes that had required close collaborations between political stakeholders
and the State’s main technical bodies. They were presented as a key requirement for
economic development and modernity, and were the object of geographic studies that
adopted  a  technocratic  perspective,  limiting  themselves  to  just  describing  the
infrastructures, looking at their potential contribution to regional development and at
best discussing the conditions of their implementation. 
6 In some respect, this background and type of analysis do appear here in the only article dedicated
to an emerging country: China (as well as in other articles that have been submitted but not
selected, on the evolution of urban networks in Africa). This article looks at industrial
development in the inland area of the Zhejiang province, spreading from the main coastal
conurbations  -  which  are  for  their  part  already  shifting  towards  tertiarization  and
consolidating  their  inner  structures.  This  industrialization  process  goes  along  with
rampant urbanization. It depends on a network of small and medium towns (on the
Chinese scale)  which consolidate each other and have allowed to maintain a relative
balance, ensuring a “better” spread of populations and economic activity. Such urban
developments go hand in hand with the construction of fast railway links. As these cities
become surrounded by densely populated territories, their administrative autonomy and
power grow stronger, allowing them to rule upon rural areas. 
7 How does this apply to Western Europe, from the global through to the local scale (noting
that the two largest scales are not present in this issue’s articles)? 
8 At the most global scale of the political discourse, there is a tendency to promote discourses in favor
of polycentrism – a blurry and polysemous concept whose scales of relevance are often not
specified (Vandermotten, Halbert, Roelandts, Cornut, 2008). This discourse is based on the
assumption, which is not empirically verified, that more polycentrism would bring better
balance and better development to Europe as a whole, and would form the grounds for
sustainable  development.  When  applied  to  Europe,  this  discourse  is  unanimously
embraced as a promise that no portion of the EU’s territory will be left behind, even
though  current  trends  favor  competition  over  cohesion.  We  have  seen  that  on  the
contrary,  this  discourse  leads  to  a  consolidation  of  Europe’s  central  space  to  the
detriment of peripheral areas (Lennert & Robert, 2007). When transposed to a national
scale, discourses in favor of polycentrism are appealing for regions and city, which see it
as more reason to hope. Local bodies base their ambitions on benchmarks that rely on
stereotypical methods and conclusions. As a result, regional and local policies only create
a windfall  effect  for investors,  without really transforming the logics of  their  spatial
behavior. This allows the State to disengage from its responsibilities in terms of local
intervention. 
9 At the top level of the hierarchy of urban realities, metropolization occurs within a globalized
world economy, against the backdrop of a tertiarization in the countries of the Center’s
economies. What we are looking at here is actual metropolization – not the kind that
cities of all sizes are now aspiring to, even when their structures are a far cry from the
characteristics of actual metropolization. This concept covers the integration of a (very)
large  city  as  a  node  of  international  accessibility:  a  node  in  the  financial,  legal,
commercial,  technical  and managerial  networks of  transnational  economy;  a place of
production,  or  at  least  of  control  of  technological  production;  and  a  major  cultural
location. The description of such networks with their nodes and their functioning modes
is well documented – see for instance the work of the GaWC1, led by P.J. Taylor and J.V.
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Beaverstock, or, in the French-speaking world, authors that include C. Rozenblat. After
Florida (2005), the economic success stories of metropolization have added value to and
been valorized by a certain literature: it studies on the one hand the creative industries’
concentration  in  such  areas,  and  the  metropolitan  renewal  that  occurs  through
gentrification;  and  on  the  other  hand,  large-scale  iconic,  “flagship”  projects.  This
dominant literature has little interest in the adverse social  effects of  these economic
successes: with an increased concentration of high-level professionals in cosmopolitan
metropolises, they exacerbate social divides, inflate property prices and generate a form
of growth that creates too few jobs for less qualified populations. As a result, growth
often goes along with high rates of unemployment, at least in the least privileged areas of
these large metropolitan conurbations.  Fortunately,  some critical  studies  can also be
found on these themes. 
10 However, although in the peripheries – European peripheries included – the metropolises
or at least the largest cities are those with the strongest economical performance, it is
also possible to find regions structured around mid-sized cities,  in the densest,  most
developed  parts  of  Europe,  that  perform  well  –  at  least  when  their  structures  are
compatible with post-industrial growth and can add value to niche economies in growth
sectors,  and  to  local  cultural  assets  and  heritage  (David,  Peeters,  Van  Hamme  &
Vandermotten, 2013). 
11 This is due to the fact that, while in North-Western Europe the largest metropolitan areas
benefit  from  economies  of  scale,  the  accessibility  and  quality  of  infrastructures,
equipment and labor can be excellent in mid-sized cities, which are often not very far
away from large metropolises. Hence the interest for regional cities and for the development
of  regional  urban  systems.  Gingembre  and  Baude’s  article  on  “Home-work  mobility  in
conurbation  networks”  (“Les  mobilités  domicile  –  travail  dans  les  réseaux
d'agglomération”) shows the autonomization of such systems, within which professionals
are able to circulate. The article could be completed by an analysis correlating these local
systems’ economic (and social) performance with their structure and perhaps with their
governance.  However,  the  article  convincingly  shows  that  although  such  emerging
systems have  facilitated the  mobility  of  the  workforce,  creating  sources  of  potential
employment, this benefits first and foremost high-level professionals. 
12 On the scale of each morphological conurbation, peri-urbanisation’s former, relatively simple
image is not relevant anymore: that of young couples with children moving out towards
the outer periphery in search of more affordable housing, in an environment they see as
more pleasant, at the cost of an increased commute into urban centers. Today, as shown
by Berger,  Aragau and Rougé  in  the  case  of  the  Western  suburbs  of  Paris  (but  this
phenomenon can also be observed throughout Western Europe), peri-urban areas, at least
around the largest cities, have developed a structure of their own, with a multiplication
of employment and service centers. The populations’ age, family status and professional
structures  have  changed.  They  have  also  stabilized,  and comprise  less  and less  first
generation  immigrants  from  city  centers.  Some  parts  of  the  peri-urban  space,  in
particular those closest to the city-centers, have aged, and some of the towns in those
spaces have seen a decrease in their population – not just because of population ageing,
but also of a negative migration balance. Peri-urban spaces have sprawled out, often in a
non-continuous manner, and transformed into “rurban” spaces, while the less well off
were being pushed out to the outer margins. However, the average distance travelled by
Urban structures and frameworks
EchoGéo, 27 | 2014
3
peri-urban  populations  on  their  home-work  commute  has  only  increased  to  a  small
extent, due to the emergence of secondary nodes. 
13 Finally, the intra-urban scale is explored by Demailly through the theme of shared gardens.
One could argue that this is micro-geography, bordering on the insignificant. However,
this  study  is  a  good  example  of  a  certain  form  of  post-modern  geography,  more
widespread in the Anglo-Saxon world, where qualitative study is combined with a method
similar to that of urban sociologists, with a preference for understanding – or simply
describing – urban behaviors rather than analyzing spatial structure. Furthermore, this
approach reveals shifts in governance.
14 Once again,  it  is  useful  to make a comparison with the situation that was prevailing
during the Fordist period: general operations were led by the State and others by local
authorities,  in a top down approach that was only challenged towards the end of the
period by sporadic community protest  actions which were for the most  part  quickly
dismissed. 
15 Nowadays,  the State tends to disengage,  or to restrict  its  role to the setting of  wide
strategic orientations. However, the State retains a greater power in France than in other
countries of Western Europe where structures are more regional or federal, and where in
some cases like Belgium its remit has completely disappeared. 
16 A varying share of responsibility in terms of local and urban development is transferred
over to the regions and cities, without those being allocated sufficient resources: this
leads to the creation of different forms of public-private partnerships, or to a complete
withdrawal of the public sector in favor of the private sector in the name of so-called
efficiency2. However, the political frameworks that preside over this de-centralization are
sometimes disconnected from the current realities of urban and regional operations. The
article about mobility within networks of conglomerations shows that in France, most of
this mobility takes place within one same region. There are however some significant
exceptions,  such as  the persistence of  two distinct  Regions in Normandie,  or  on the
contrary the functionality of a single Rhône-Alpes Region that associates independent
units  like  the  Lyon  urban  area,  the  French  side  of  Geneva  and  the  Alpine  valley.
Modifications  in  territorial  frameworks  are  very  difficult  to  achieve:  they  need  to
overcome the inertia of political powers in place as well as individual interests. This is
visible for instance in the way that the population of affluent Dutch suburbs refuses to
accept  the  creation  of  metropolitan  provinces  that  could  mutualize  the  expenses  of
central conurbations with the resources of the rich suburbs. In Belgium, the resistance to
an  extension  of  the  limits  of  the  “Région-Capitale”,  or  the  obstacles  to  the
implementation of a wider metropolitan area comprising of the capital and its periphery -
although its powers would be very limited - are not just due to linguistic factors: they are
also caused by the suburban local authorities’ refusal of having to bear the costs of the
central areas, despite the fact that their inhabitants benefit from them on an everyday
basis. 
17 In  a  general  environment  that  valorizes  private  sector  action,  where  competition
between cities  is  implicitly  encouraged by  references  to  a  globalized  economy,  local
authorities are paralyzed by the scarcity of their financial resources and are having to
give in to the dominant ideology: the public sector must support gentrification, cosmetic
improvements and cultural attractiveness for the creative industries. What right-wing
political  powers  are  expecting  from this  evolution  is  quite  clear.  However,  Lebeau’s
article “Une banlieue ‘créative’  dans le Grand Paris?” (“‘Creative’  suburbs for Greater
Urban structures and frameworks
EchoGéo, 27 | 2014
4
Paris?”) shows that left-wing authorities are also giving in to this trend, although they
are trying to spread a “democratic” varnish over such choices. The paper shows how
illusory it is to expect to develop a “creative city” that can be both attractive under the
terms  of  the  dominant  economy  and  socially  inclusive,  by  pushing  out  the  more
alternative and rebellious forms of popular culture. Outside of France, the example of
Brussels also shows that Socialist city authorities are all the more keen to “eradicate”
urban  poverty  through  gentrification  and  cosmetic  policies  that  they  are  managing
disadvantaged areas, and are therefore seeking to grow their tax income and to reduce
the costs they are having to bear because of their very social makeup. 
18 This gentrification, this desire to attract the middle classes, the “creative” classes and
educated populations, requires for local authorities to provide opportunities for these
classes to participate in governance. However, the article on shared gardens in the Paris
region  (“Les  jardins  partagés  franciliens”)  shows  the  limitations  of  such  initiatives:
ultimately, decision-making remains the preserve of political authorities, even in the case
of initiatives that appear as more spontaneous. 
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NOTES
1. www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc.
2. With  a  British  variant  where  the  State  tends  to  take  responsibilities  away  from  local
authorities,  which  are  powerless  but  sometimes  difficult  to  control,  and  hand them over  to
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